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In the paper I am concerned with various manifestations of aesthetic fear and anxiety, that 
is, fear and anxiety triggered by works of art, which I discuss from aesthetic as well as anthro-
pological perspectives. I analyse the link between fear and pleasure in catharsis, in Edmund 
Burke’s notion of the sublime, and in reference to Goya’s Black Paintings and to Paul Virilio’s 
thought. Both aesthetic fear and aesthetic anxiety exist alongside other emotions, such as pity 
and sadness, and, most notably, alongside pleasure which is autonomous or which arises from 
a fascination with evil.
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On a map of human emotions fear and anxiety must be placed among the most 
fundamental of feelings: each of them may trigger the most extreme emotional 
states; they have both individual and communal aspects, and although they 
belong to the active, bright side of life, they can also manifest themselves in the 
domain of the night, of dream and of disease. Here I am predominantly con-
cerned with fear and anxiety as aesthetic phenomena, that is, the way in which 
they are evoked by works of art, or as they are expressed through or represented 
in works of art.1 What links the various perspectives and angles from which fear 
and anxiety are presented or described in a number of different fields is certain 
1 This is an extremely broad issue, even more so if we assume that art, apart from its purely 
aesthetic aspect, also has cognitive, psychological or religious functions. I use the terms fear, 
anxiety, dread, horror and terror more or less interchangeably, since although it certainly is an 
oversimplification, to specify each term would require me to considerably expand the scope 
of this paper. 
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ambiguity inherent in these phenomena: fear may be provoked by something 
which is frightening in itself,2 and the most dramatic effect can be achieved if 
both the subjective feeling of fear and the fear-inspiring quality of the object 
are combined. Fears and anxieties might, to a great extent, define a person and 
characterize the world in which he or she lives, sometimes binding the two with 
inextricable ties through the cruelty and suffering to which the individual is 
subjected and to which he or she succumbs. In the optimistic days of the Enlight-
enment it was believed that fear and anxiety could be conquered; now, however, 
we seem to have come to terms with their inevitability and tend to focus on 
determining their varieties, characterizing their manifestations and recording 
their changeable forms so that if not a cure then at least some sort of treatment 
or therapy can be found.
Fear and anxiety manifest themselves in all spheres of human life. The bio-
logical manifestation of fear constitutes the ‘wisdom’ of nature, which, according 
to Antoni Kępiński, in providing us with advance warning enables us to avoid 
potentially dangerous situations (KĘPIŃSKI 1995: 33). Such low-amplitude 
fear is an evolutionary mechanism, whose purpose is to help us surmount obsta-
cles and barriers and to adjust to new conditions as well as stimulating activity. 
Thus a certain measure of fear is necessary for further development. Although 
both fear and anxiety are accompanied by somatic symptoms, they are by no 
means limited to biology. Apart from energy metabolism Kępiński identifies 
information metabolism, which he sees as a uniquely human way of creating 
warning systems. The iconosphere facilitates our orientation in every sphere of 
cultural reality, enables us to communicate with one another and to adapt to 
our surroundings. From this perspective the modern culture of images, includ-
ing popular culture as well as the fine arts, composes a network of meanings 
with an emotive tinge, by means of which both individuals and communities 
are able to make sense of their world, act in it and cooperate. Kępiński points 
out, however, that people with their ability to abstract fear from its particular 
circumstances are able to rise above a specific situation in their minds, thereby 
releasing the content of the fear and shifting it in time and space. Warning sig-
nals and stimuli, originally meant to keep an individual from danger, become 
autonomous. Having lost its biological functions fear takes on the amorphous 
shape of meta-anxiety, ‘liquid fear’ (BAUMAN 2008: 8–9). This is the kind of 
anxiety that populates people’s minds with images of improbable catastrophes 
and may cause neuroses and aberrations, so it is vitally important to diagnose and 
offer treatment to people suffering from it so that they can function normally 
in their everyday lives. The sphere of social life constitutes a vast area generat-
ing meta-anxiety and fear, with the media reports on economic recession, wars, 
2 Kierkegaard discusses subjective and objective anxiety (KIERKEGAARD 1996: 67–74). 
Karl H. Bohrer points to two ways in which anxiety manifests itself (BOHRER 2003: 39).
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natural and man-made disasters and new diseases being used to manipulate the 
public. Paul Ricoeur claims that the communal side of human existence, “the 
public part, cannot raise itself above the fear”, that society as a whole cannot be 
freed from fear, so we must try to overcome it individually (RICOEUR 1986: 
45). The existence of meta-anxiety directs us towards the spiritual. Søren Kier-
kegaard describes the spiritual, existential anxiety which has its origin not in any 
external circumstances but in the tension brought on by the discord between the 
constraints imposed on a person by their corporality and temporality and their 
dynamic and free self. Yet anxiety with its potential for self-reflection “allows 
a human being to sense his or her higher-order relationship to being. It is the 
anxiety of the mind” (ROHDE 2001: 194). Throughout history people have 
undertaken numerous attempts to prevail over fear and anxiety and have come 
up with a wide range of ways to cope with them through rationalization, extrac-
tion, sublimation or compensation. Art has played a significant role in these 
endeavours thanks to its capability to operate across the psychological, social, 
spiritual spheres and the fact that, as a consequence, it requires an anthropologi-
cal perspective. The aesthetician is mainly concerned with the artistic qualities 
of a work of art, its formal and expressive features. The anthropologist, on the 
other hand, sets out to explore the practices in which artworks participate and, 
in doing so, attempts to answer the questions: what is expressed through a par-
ticular work of art, what is its function in human life? Since mental states such 
as fear and anxiety are notoriously difficult to describe, a consideration of both 
of these perspectives might prove productive. Hans Belting appears to provide 
a helpful pointer when he maintains that creating images is a basic human need 
and, consequently, rejects the claims made by theoreticians that various forms 
of creating images should be treated separately. He dismisses as irrelevant not 
only the division between painting, photography and mass media pictures but 
also between religious, artistic and documentary images. Mental, notional and 
oneiric images all originate in the body and the body is their primary and fun-
damental site. We create images and we like having them around because of our 
corporality, and the corporal aspect of human existence is continually affected by 
time, space and death (BELTING 2007: 13). Following these three body vectors 
contained in images can help us find out how fear and anxiety are expressed. 
In religions based on myth and ritual fear constitutes an integral part of sac-
rificial rites, whose aim is to restore the cosmic and communal harmony. This 
mythical, archaic fear is explained by myth, so perhaps the term ‘awe’ would be 
more appropriate. By linking suffering to a flaw, to the transgression of a law, cau-
sality is established in the process which Ricoeur sees as a rationalizing schema, 
the ‘rationalization’ of the evil inherent in suffering.3 Such sacred fear belonging 
to the religious realm is an essential part of communal experience, yet it can also 
3 Ricoeur also uses the term ‘ethical terror’ (RICOEUR 1986: 32). 
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be experienced personally as the mysterium tremendum and fascinans, introduc-
ing an individual into the numinous order, implying “that the mysterious is al-
ready beginning to loom before the mind, to touch the feelings” (OTTO 1999: 
20). Many commentators see the Aristotelian notion of catharsis as an exempli-
fication of just such a sacral dimension of an archaic myth, where an individual is 
inseparably tied to the community (KOLANKIEWICZ 1999: 186–189). The 
new elements emerge, however, as the fate of an individual comes to occupy the 
dominant position and the one who feels fear is a tragic hero. Moreover, fear is 
accompanied by another emotion, pity: the feeling of fear is the consequence 
of the feeling of pity (δί έλέου καί φόβου) (ARYSTOTELES 1965: 10). The 
experience of catharsis, that is, the release of emotions, offers no moral lesson, 
nor does it lead to any reflection,4 it can simply be evoked by listening to a dra-
matic narrative,5 while the fact that it is precisely determined what art forms 
are required to evoke pity and fear must be recognized as the literaturization of 
myth, with myth being employed for the purposes of art.6 For Mircea Eliade the 
direct consequence is the lack of continuity between myth and art and the loss 
of the sacred dimension in art, which is supplanted by another kind of experi-
ence. In other words, what is lost is this aspect of fear which united a human 
being with the cosmic rhythm. Karl Heinz Bohrer, on the other hand, welcomes 
the emergence of literary (aesthetic) fear which, in his opinion, is possessed of 
more valuable qualities due to its autonomous character, its independence from 
the historical and social context. In Greek tragedy he finds the origins of the 
aesthetics of terror (BOHRER 2003: 47). Bohrer, therefore, is a proponent 
of the unique experience which is available to us through a work of art. These 
positions — emphasizing continuity or departure, dependence on the context 
or autonomy — defend different causes, and yet in a sense they overlap. The 
conservative one stresses the liberating aspect of art grounded in anthropology 
or religion. The one advocating emancipation highlights the evolution of new 
forms of expression and practices which cannot be compared with anything 
existing before (Eliade). And finally Bohrer puts emphasis on the transpsycho-
logical dimension of aesthetic fear but at the same time he dissociates himself 
from either anthropology or religion. It seems that the images inspired by fear 
— those which provoke fear as well as the ones which show the atrocities of suf-
fering and cruelty — are not exclusively contextual and some of them might have 
the capacity to direct our reflection beyond the historical literalism of the work. 
From the anthropological perspective there is no conflict between history and 
autonomous aesthetics, since in different historical periods the stress was placed 
on different aspects of fear. Modernity gives priority to the autonomous value of 
4 On the categories of songs: ethical, practical, enthusiastic, cf. ARYSTOTELES, Polityka, 
Θ 7, 1341 b 32–1342 a 16.
5 ARYSTOTELES, Poetyka, 1453b5.
6 ARYSTOTELES, Poetyka, 1454a11. 
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an artwork and experience, whereas postmodernism, as exemplified by Lyotard, 
recognizes an artwork as both autonomous and context-dependent: a work of 
art becomes a double agent, characterized by ambivalence as it both detaches 
itself from the world and helps to establish a community.7
Thus the pity and fear of ancient tragedy, being undeniably aesthetic phe-
nomena achieved by purely artistic means and occurring in the space-time con-
tinuum of a work, must be placed on the borderline between physical sensations 
and moral experiences. Tragedy’s arousing and subsequently purging of fear 
results in a pleasure of a special kind ensuing from ‘pity and fear’, bringing relief 
tinged with delight and harmless enjoyment to people.8 It seems that considering 
catharsis in terms of ethical understanding, or, as Ricoeur proposes, a mode of 
understanding, must be recognized as a modern reinterpretation of the notion 
of catharsis.9 Unquestionably, the relationship between fear and pity determines 
the quality of pleasure. Furthermore, aesthetic fear is invariably complemented 
by another emotion and only combined can they accomplish whatever the artist 
has intended. Fear by no means precludes us from experiencing beauty, since in 
contemplating tragedies from a distance we can admire the beauty of the plot 
or the poetic song of the chorus. As far as aesthetic theories are concerned, this 
complex relationship between fear, aesthetic pleasure and beauty presents a great 
deal of problems for philosophers: some of them choose to separate the pleasure 
ensuing from fear from beauty, others bring them together. Nonetheless, two 
vital components of aesthetic fear need to be highlighted here: the fact that it is 
never pure but invariably coupled with another emotion, and that its outcome 
is a pleasure in a very special sense of the word.10 And finally the one who feels 
fear is not some model of universal man, but a specific real person who possesses 
his or her own mental, social and spiritual life.
In Christianity the entire conception of the world undergoes a complete 
change; the quality of being tragic no longer causes fear, since guilt is seen in 
a different light. Still Christianity and Greek tragedy concur with each other in 
that guilt and creativity are inextricably linked (NIEBUHR 1985: 110). They 
both grapple with the situation of an individual at the mercy of the powers be-
yond his or her control, powers which can neither be predicted nor controlled. 
7 This ambivalence can be found in the writings of Friedrich Schiller, Theodore Adorno 
and Jacques Rancière, although their theoretical perspectives differ substantially.
8 ARYSTOTELES, Poetyka, 1453b10; ARYSTOTELES, Polityka, Θ 7, 1342 a 16.
9 It must be noted that Ricoeur does not refer to Aristotle’s Poetics, but discusses Aeschy-
lus’ tragedies, among others. He proposes his own conception of purification and reverses the 
order of the emotions: for him pity proceeds from fear. Catharsis does not have to be linked 
exclusively to fear and tragedy (RICOEUR 1986: 231). See among others DZIEMIDOK 
2002: 181–235.
10 Burke talks about delight as opposed to the pleasure evoked by the beautiful, Kant de-
fines the sublime as a negative pleasure, Bohrer refers to a pleasurable sensation. However, it is 
always the kind of fear which does not relate to any real danger. 
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In the Christian theological interpretation at the end of one’s days death and 
suffering will be conquered, the world redeemed and trespasses forgiven, albeit 
only in the case of reformed and repentant sinners. Fear belongs to this world, to 
mortal life; however, the sinner’s fear differs significantly from the saint’s, since 
the former can be healed by an act of contrition whereas the latter can find no re-
lief. The spiritual fear reveals the duality of the human condition defined by cor-
porality as much as by spirituality, “I shudder, inasmuch as I unlike it; I kindle, 
inasmuch as I am like it”, Saint Augustine confesses (AUGUSTYN 1987: 279). 
And lastly God himself feels fear as he stands defenceless against human violence 
and cruelty.11 Throughout the centuries the intensity of fear has varied and, as 
a result, its presentation has been subject to periodic changes, which is perhaps 
best illustrated by the artistic portrayals of the notion of eternal damnation 
and hell, that is, the fear of eternal fear. The Last Judgement was carved on the 
tympana of Romanesque churches and depicted on Italian frescoes by Paolo 
di Neri and Botticelli. It constituted a prominent theme in the works of the 
Early Netherlandish masters, van Eyck and Memling, as well as in Hieronymus 
Bosch’s The Garden of Earthly Delights with its gruesome imagery. However, 
its popularity declined at the beginning of the 17th century.12 In modern times 
Jean-François Lyotard forged the term ‘unpresentable’ to refer to the imposition 
of restrictions, voluntary refrainment from any attempts at presentation in order 
to leave space for the inexpressible mystery, although admittedly for Lyotard 
the term had no religious or sacred connotations. Interestingly, however, it was 
at the end of the 20th century, the age of genocide, that Hans Urs von Balthasar 
reintroduced Origen’s conception of apocatastasis, the early Christian belief in 
universal reconciliation, the unity of the world and God with no dualistic divi-
sions, thereby consigning hell, along with the fear it strikes into people’s hearts, 
to the sphere of human activities.
While contemplating medieval portrayals of the torments inflicted upon 
the damned, we must not forget that they constitute merely a component of 
the universal order and are meant to represent the ideas of justice. Therefore, 
they should perhaps be regarded in the contexts of the depictions of the tortures 
which martyrs were subjected to. In this case the deliverance from fear is made 
possible by the belief that cruelty and death are an intrinsic part of an ethical 
and sacred order in which suffering acquires mystical meaning and metaphysical 
validation. The expression of horror on the faces of the damned as well as the 
calm countenances of the tormented saints show fear but the fear is at the same 
time transcended and redefined. The transition from psychological to spiritual 
fear is grounded in and guaranteed by theology. This was a hierarchical world of 
11 “Now is my soul troubled; and what shall I say; Father save me from this hour”, Christ’s 
prayer, John 12:27, Holy Bible. 
12 At the same time witchcraft trials and animal trials subsided, Galileo’s works were pub-
lished and modern science was born.
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unity, which Michel Foucault calls ‘the space of emplacement’, underlining the 
fact that everybody and everything occupied their proper places (FOUCAULT 
1986: 22). That world regarded ugliness as complementary to beauty while evil 
and suffering were but transitory states on the road leading to universal good. 
The overall structure of the spiritual order, in which the plan for eternity was of 
crucial importance, remained inviolate.13
In the age of Enlightenment fear was rationalized by means of science, which 
legitimised the institutions of the secular state. Scientific methods and the results 
of scientific research determined public discourse to be the only source of valid 
meanings. Other forms of rationalization, including religion, were relegated to 
the private space, while the scope and subject matter of any artistic endeavour 
was subject to the verdict of the Academy.14 Art museums carefully selected only 
those artworks which were deemed perfect to be displayed and placed them in 
chronological order so as to illustrate the historical development of styles and 
types of beauty; the systematisation and aestheticization of art left viewers with 
the impression of the clarity and continuity of historical processes. The faster 
the process of modernization was progressing in real life, the greater was the 
significance attached to historicization, which afforded a sense of security, and 
emotional and material substance for both individual and national identity and 
a sense of continuity. Karl Pazzini maintains that although nobody associates the 
museum with death, it still becomes “a testing ground for the denial and the de-
fence against death […] the museum helps us to suppress the fear of death”.15 The 
public viewed death masks, dissected human corpses, biological specimens and 
works of art in a state of immutable timelessness. Aestheticization, the manner 
in which exhibits were constructed, their appearance adjusted to conform to the 
requirements of perception, prevented the process of decay from entering the so-
cial consciousness. Although the knowledge of the world was expanding and the 
world was being put into order, fear was never far away, the fear that the stability 
of life might be lost. The fine arts helped, as they made it possible to enjoy one’s 
freedom and offered relief by granting protection from the confusion brought 
about by innovations and technology. The same era that revived the ideals of 
classical antiquity, and delighted in the radiant images of Arcadia and the Apol-
lonian representations of ancient myths, witnessed the parallel emergence of the 
sublime, as aesthetic fear was reinterpreted and associated with the new forms 
of expression. Edmund Burke no longer found deeper meaning in the pictorial 
13 What needs to be emphasized here is that the mere presentation of ugliness is far from 
a sufficient reason to talk about horrifying pictures; on the contrary, ugliness can serve as a de-
fence mechanism against fear (ROSIŃSKA 1985: 168). 
14 It can be said that since the times of Vasari, the history of art has been the imposing of 
rationality on works of art; Didi-Huberman asserts that it “ignores the dark influences of pic-
tures, this economy of obsession and fear” (DIDI-HUBERMAN 2011: 148).
15 Pazzini calls museums institutions of safe presence (PAZZINI 1990: 85).
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representations of hell. He regarded them as a sign of artistic failure, a source of 
ridicule with its proper place in the realm of the grotesque rather “than anything 
capable of producing a serious passion” (BURKE 1937: 54). What proved more 
appealing to the modern imagination was the situations characterized by ambi-
guity, mystery and certain darkness, not only in music and poetry but also in the 
visual arts. That the content of a work would be frightening was less important 
than the fear-inspiring artistic devices: the ways of creating horror had to be ter-
rifying in themselves.16 
Francisco Goya, recovering from a near-fatal illness, which coincided with 
the political turmoil in Spain, created a series of prints called Los Caprichos, the 
most famous of which is the etching of a sleeping person surrounded by owls 
and bats poised to attack. The print is provided with a caption, reading, “The 
sleep of reason produces monsters”. Another set, The Disasters of War, comprises 
82 small prints, each with a caption or title: Barbarians!, A Cruel Shame!, What 
Madness!, This is the absolute worst!. The viewer, confronted with the image and 
its equally shocking caption, is rattled, incapable of adopting a visual distance or 
a disinterested, detached stance. According to Susan Sontag, “with Goya a new 
standard for responsiveness to suffering enters art” (SONTAG 2004: 45). The 
fourteen works known as the Black Paintings, which Goya painted directly on 
the walls on both storeys of the house he bought outside Madrid (Quinta del 
Sordo), share a similarly haunting tone. 
Goya’s works have been extensively commented on and several distinct inter-
pretational threads can be distinguished. The artist’s experience of insanity and 
anxiety, and above all the illness he never completely recovered from, altered 
the mood of his painting. He still accepted commissions from the nobility and 
royalty, but at the same time he painted madness, cruelty and the monstrosity 
of man. However, Ortega y Gasset argues that it was not a conscious departure 
from the principles of the fine arts, but rather failed, flawed works, indicating 
creative deficiency. “The truth is that Goya’s work did not originate in conscious 
reflection: it must be seen as either common craft or the vision of a somnam-
bulist” (ORTEGA Y GASSET 1993: 282). Nevertheless, these lesser artistic 
forms, the caprices, the etchings and the murals later transferred to the Museo 
del Prado, make us see Goya as an unquestionably modern painter, critical, 
revealing the destructive power that the faculty of reason is capable of — an 
artist-philosopher. And most importantly, he exposes the hidden aspects of hu-
man nature, the madness which he himself succumbed to: 
Madness has become the possibility in man of abolishing both man and the world — 
and even these images that challenge the world and deform humanity. It lies deeper than 
16 This distinction is made by Goethe, and Bohrer considers it to be a good diagnosis of 
the modern approach to fear (horror) in art (BOHRER 2003: 63). 
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 dreams, well below the nightmare of animality, a last resort: the end and the beginning of 
all things (FOUCAULT 2006: 531). 
Chaos constitutes the latent possibility within the rational order and no 
efforts are capable of diminishing its power. Goya’s works unveil “the night of 
classical unreason” (FOUCAULT 2006: 531) they present the pessimistic vision 
of humankind and the world we have created. Anxiety and fear are brought to 
light. Other interpreters notice the moralistic intent of the artist, who depicts 
“The horrifying portrayal of the world plunged into chaos and inhabited by des-
picable human monsters whose base instincts […] he laid bare” (HONOUR and 
FLEMING 2006: 650). The dark sketchy paintings bringing to mind shadow 
painting and Robertson’s phantasmagoria were meant for a limited circle of 
viewers (MULLER 1984: 207–238). The artist wanted them to provoke fear 
and horror and, in doing so, educate, expose the dark side of the Inquisition 
and the secular authorities. The sketchy character of the scenes, reminiscent of 
optical theatre, suggests light-enhanced images (MULLER 1984: 211, 213). 
They cannot be categorized as terribilità, which characterized the emotional and 
dramatic pictorial compositions of Mannerist painting. The viewer was assailed 
from each side by the shapes trembling in the dark (e.g. Saturn Devouring his 
Child or Judith and Holofernes on the side wall of the second storey), “whose 
effectiveness was intensified by incorporating the horrific, the terrifying and the 
Sublime” (MULLER 1984: 233). And although the line between the thrill of 
entertainment and education is fine and easy to cross over, Muller substantiates 
the moral message of Goya’s works by referring to Burke’s conception of the 
sublime and his views on the French Revolution.
According to Burke’s philosophical thought, aesthetic fear is autonomous 
with regard to morality as well as cognition, despite triggering the same response 
in the body as if a person experiencing it was actually in a life-threatening situ-
ation. Its autonomous character results from the fact that it leads to a pleasure 
derived from the experience of the sublime, and is followed by a reflection tinged 
with pathos and deference. Its additional outcome is the boost in vital force. 
If fear is provoked by an artist’s work, the distance is kept, and artistic devices 
aimed at the reduction of the distance can only simulate a threatening situation. 
However, in the case of natural phenomena as well as the spectacles of history, 
such as the French Revolution, the distance is not sufficient to completely elimi-
nate the danger, the real threat to a person’s life. The key issue here is the manner 
in which fear is approached. Burke himself views the Revolution as a spectacle 
arousing natural feelings and stimulating reflection (danger and sympathy have 
the power to purify our souls), but it is also a work of art likened to a drama 
staged ‘by the Supreme Director’ (BURKE 1937: 119).17 One possible approach 
17 In another place Burke writes about a paradoxical and mysterious work of art which 
provokes the state of suspension and amazement, quoted after SHAW 2006: 64.
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to the Revolution is not with fear or the sense of the sublime but the contempt 
for ‘base criminals’ (BURKE 1937: 101). According to Hayden White, Burke 
drew a radical distinction between the sublime and historical events (WHITE 
1982: 124–125). Burke indeed distinguished between the false sublime (when 
the danger is real) and the true sublime, in which the phase of fear is directly 
followed by delight and reflection. This distinction, however, did not apply to 
the Revolution, since Burke himself at one moment apparently distressed by the 
events, which, luckily, did not concern Great Britain, subsequently “elevate[d] 
terror to the dignity of the sublime” (SHAW 2006: 70), or made ironic com-
ments on the Revolution. Thus it seems legitimate to say that Burke’s under-
standing of the sublime and fear allowed him, under certain circumstances, to 
view wars and revolution from the perspective of aesthetics and experience the 
sublime,18 but also burst the boundaries of the autonomy of art and, as a con-
sequence, experience artworks from the perspective of political events. Perhaps 
this is what Muller has in mind when he underlines the educational aspects of 
Goya’s work. We have to assume, however, that the traumatic experiences of the 
viewers triggered by the works ultimately result in critical reflection. In Kantian 
transcendentalism, on the other hand, there is nothing to prevent a real war from 
inspiring the sense of the sublime, since sublimity concerns not an object but the 
ideas of the mind; fear stimulates the mind which becomes aware of its superior-
ity over nature and of the ideas it possesses.19 Therefore, aesthetic fear as defined 
here belongs to the transcendental realm (thus it is spiritual): a human being is 
not afraid of the threat (war) but of his or her own inner mental state, of his or 
her own inability to represent ideas; reason is superior to sensuality.
Arnold Berleant applies Burke’s and Kant’s notion of the sublime to current 
events in order to demonstrate elements of spectacle in terrorist acts, their aes-
thetic aspects. The immoral — evil — dimensions of terrorism, however, make 
him term it the negative sublime (BERLEANT 2011: 203–205). Yet he ignores 
the philosophical differences between the two stances; and, moreover, he uses 
them with regard to the aesthetic qualities of contemporary events disregarding 
the fact that now the notions of aestheticism and the sublime have acquired 
a completely different meaning. The postmodern sublime has little to do with 
subjectivity, autonomous art or the ideas of the mind; neither does it refer to 
the Kantian conception, where it was capable of according a sense of freedom 
and dignity to a human being (WHITE 1982: 126). It must rather be associated 
with trauma: it is the political sublime in the times of global anxiety and the 
mind disgraced by the Holocaust (RAY 2005), where the threat, whose measure 
18 It can also be applied to the melancholic sublime as well as the Nero complex. 
19 “Sublimity, therefore, does not reside in any of the things of nature, but only in our own 
mind, in so far as we may become conscious of our superiority over nature within, and thus 
also over nature without us (as exerting influence upon us)” (KANT 1986: 163). 
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is the image of the genocide, has become a permanent backdrop for human life. 
Artists and theoreticians ( Joseph Beuys, Christian Boltanski, Damian Hirst, 
Mirosław Bałka among others) are attempting to address such issues, as are the 
curators of the exhibitions in the museums of terror, war and the Holocaust. 
Remarkably, however, despite the great number of artistic works and exhibi-
tions, graphic representations or processes intensifying negative emotions are 
notably absent, apparently deliberately avoided, perhaps because the weight of 
the problems would be beyond the capabilities of any literal portrayal to bear. 
Paul Virilio’s position appears symptomatic, as he links fear and art directly and, 
since he considers a different aspect of the relationship, he can dispense with the 
old concept of the sublime. He states that the avant-garde artists’ involvement 
in political movements and their participation in the transformations of social 
life makes them directors of social projects. Artistic strategies draw on warfare 
for will power and creative ideas. It takes place in the order of the manifested 
tasks which are assigned to the art which Virilio calls ‘A Pitiless Art’ (VIRILIO 
2006: 15–34), as the artists make no attempt to hide the violence with which 
they want to assault the audience. The confirmation can be found, for instance, 
in the declarations of the futurists (‘war is the world’s only hygiene’), or Antonin 
Artaud’s Theatre of Cruelty. This artistic stance is directly translated into the 
order of artistic devices: state-of-the-art technologies enable artists to reach the 
highest emotional registers, comparable to those experienced by the victims of 
real-life catastrophes, such as the sinking of the Titanic, the Holocaust or the 
Chernobyl disaster. From the times of Baudelaire, Kokoschka and the futur-
ists to BioArt and the virtual world of avatars, art has been reinforcing anxiety 
through its connection with the unknown, with speed, with disappearing (of 
images, bodies, communities). In a different context, Virilio refers to accursed 
art (art maudit): our sensitivity to evil is destroyed as a result of the changes in 
perception (VIRILIO 2006: 16). The piles of glasses and shoes in Auschwitz are 
seen as the artefacts of modern art, which for a long time has been transforming 
ready-made objects into artworks. Virilio quotes Jacqueline Lichtenstein who 
maintains that artists “had won since they’d produced forms of perception that 
are all of a piece with the mode of destruction they made their own” (VIRILIO 
2006: 15). The fact that the boundaries between art and everyday life have be-
come blurred, that the images requiring concentration have been intermingled 
with the trivial, random ones, as they frequently are on all kinds of websites, has 
completely altered the nature of aesthetic fear or anxiety as well as the accom-
panying emotions. 
The union of art and fear posited by the philosopher is based on a certain 
conception of progress, in which its only measure is the efficiency and speed of 
the implements of war; it is no longer governed by telos but by the madness of 
rationality, and stagnation means death — it is the only law ruling the world 
(VIRILIO 2008: 90). The killing machines as well as the images of terrorists’ 
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acts and disasters combine the aspects of spectacle with the fear of a real danger. 
He writes about the media coverage of 11th September 2001: 
And so this dramatic portrayal has created, in televiewers, a twin fear, a stereo-anxiety. 
Alarm over public insecurity has been topped up with fear of the images of ‘audiovisual’ 
insecurity, bringing about a sudden highlighting of domestic terror, designed to intensify 
collective anguish (VIRILIO 2007: 21). 
Yet this is the world arranged by men and for men, the world where only the 
things which can be used as a form of transport have the right to exist: from 
a woman (a man’s first vehicle) through warhorses and other animals used in 
warfare, to machines and nuclear weaponry. This reductionism exposes the 
social and political context of fear and anxiety, and at the same time it aspires to 
exclusivity and, in doing so, makes further debate impossible.20 From this angle, 
both fear and anxiety are artificially induced by the blind desire for change, the 
human condition is determined by his or her social circumstances locked in the 
present, which leaves no room for distance. This does not mean that such fear 
or anxiety are not accompanied by pleasure. Although Virilio does not mention 
it, it follows from his reflection as an inevitable consequence. Such pleasure is 
fuelled by curiosity and fascination, speed and evil (destruction, cruelty, death).21 
The philosophy of art has attempted to transfer the pleasure resulting from 
fear outside the realm of everyday life, to tie it to artistic qualities, which is not 
to say that such a pleasure derived from the fascination with evil is a unique 
characteristic of our times: it was present long before. Now both tendencies are 
equally prominent. There is no denying that a contemporary inhabitant of a city 
(which constitutes the space where messages are intensified) is confronted with 
an excess of violent images (showing victims of wars, famine and violence) — the 
images which cannot possibly be taken in, absorbed or experienced. This excess 
does not necessarily provoke fear, it might rather result in desensitization, as 
a kind of self-defence mechanism. The images of the macabre can satisfy curios-
ity, but art can also provide a cure for fear and anxiety. In a letter to his son, dated 
28th December 1944, John Ronald Reuel Tolkien wrote: 
But if lit[erature] teaches us anything at all, it is this: that we have in us an eternal element, 
free from care and fear, which can survey the things that in ‘life’ we call evil with serenity 
(that is not without appreciating their quality, but without any disturbance of our spiritual 
equilibrium) (TOLKIEN 2010: 179–180).
20 Virilio lists the names of artists, artistic trends and political events (Turner, Futurism, 
Duchamp, Chaplin, Bonnard, Grünewald, von Hagens, Faiyum mummy portraits), which 
unless properly analysed can illustrate any conceivable theory. 
21 Struk writes about the pleasure and satisfaction which could be experienced while look-
ing at photographs from Auschwitz (STRUK 2007: 281).
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